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Reasons without Humans 
JAMES LENMAN 
1. 
Brian Hedden, in this impressively learned and ingenious, if somewhat maddening book
1
, defends a 
view he calls Time-slice Rationality, a view comprising two central claims. They are these. 
Synchronicity: All requirements of rationality are synchronic. (8) 
Impartiality: In determining how you rationally ought to be at a time, your beliefs about 
what attitudes you have at other times play the same role as your beliefs about what 
attitudes other people have. (9) 
Hedden begins by objecting to principles of rationality he deems dubiously diachronic. The first is 
conditionalization. This tells me that if I believe the conditional probability of H given E to be x, then, 
should I discover E to be true, I should believe H to have probability x. The objection to this that it 
involves an unmotivated conservativism: it gives weight after you learn new information to what you 
believed beforehand. Hedden also complains that it is unhelpful about what to do in cases where we 
forget stuff or otherwise lose evidence. It therefore at least  ?cannot be the whole story when it 
comes to rational belief change. ? (p. 43) He then considers and rejects an analogous principle for 
preferences: 
It is a condition of rationality that ultimate preferences  W preferences over maximally 
specific possibilities  W do not change over time. (47) 
He goes on to urge rejection reflection principles that tell us to defer to our future selves, both with 
respect to preferences and with respect to beliefs.  
Those who believe in synchronic rationality fear that without it we may be led to perform what 
Hedden calls tragic sequences of actions where a tragic sequence is a sequence such that at all times 
we would rather be performing some other sequence. Tragic attitudes are attitudes that open you 
to the risk of performing a tragic sequence. Thus someone departing from the epistemic 
conservativism implicit in conditionalization opens herself to exploitation through a Dutch book (a 
set of bets that together guarantee a loss). And instability in our preferences opens us to courses of 
action that tragically defeat our own purposes. Thus we can imagine a Russian nobleman (in a 
ǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWĂƌĨŝƚ ?Ɛclassic example) who in his liberal youth donates generously to liberal causes and 
in his conservative old age again donates generously to conservative causes where the donations 
cancel each other out in such a way he might as well have kept his money. Hedden thinks to avoid 
this worry for Synchronicity by arguing that the rational ought does not apply to sequences of 
actions. ,ĂǀŝŶŐƐƚĂďůĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŚĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ŝƐƌĂƚŚĞƌůŝŬĞŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŐŽŽĚŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂ
desideratum, nice way to be, but we are not irrational when we fail to be this way. As far as the 
theory of rationality is concerned this is a desideratum we can simply, as we might say, outsource. 
Failing to satisfy it is a cognitive and practical misfortune perhaps but not a form of irrationality. 
                                                          
1
 Brian Hedden: Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, identity and Time (Oxford: OUP, 2015). References are 
to this book unless otherwise specified.  
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He then tells us what he thinks are some correct principles of rationality. They are: 
Uniqueness: Given a body of total evidence, there is a unique doxastic state that it is rational 
to be in. (130) 
And:  
Synchronic conditionalization: Let P be the uniquely rational prior probability function. If at 
time t you have total evidence E your credence at t in each proposition H should equal 
P(H/E). (138) 
Where preferences are concerned, Hedden urges that we accept preference uniqueness: 
Preference uniqueness: Given a body of total evidence, there is a unique set of (ultimate) 
preferences that it is rational to have. (149) 
Where ultimate preferences are preferences over maximally specific possibilities, complete possible 
worlds. In fact he prefers a strong version of this claim that drops the relativisation to bodies of 
evidence. He also proposes a Principle of expert deference: where an expert is a person who is 
perfectly rational and has strictly more evidence than you do, you should agree with any expert 
about anything.  
Hedden acknowledges that his time-slice view of rationality is only very promising for propositional 
justification (a matter merely of whether your evidence supports your beliefs) and will not so easily 
handle doxastic justification (whether the basis on which you hold your beliefs is a sound one).  The 
latter may for example make reference to whether one possesses a general disposition to belief 
ǁŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽŶĞŚĂƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĚŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚĂ
disposition in arriving at a given belief. Here he considers two options, the first being to outsource 
doxastic rationality and limit the scope of his theory to propositional justification;  in the second, 
taking his inspiration from Williamson, Hedden suggests that time-slice centric norms of 
propositional justification are primary, other, less plausibly time-centric norms that may govern 
doxastic justification are derivative from these. Epistemology is  ?time slice first ? (182). 
Hedden ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ to the snapshot concern, Do we get it right? He has more or less 
nothing to say about the question how we get there, or fail to. That is a matter of reasoning, the 
stuff we need to do to be at all successful. Well, yes, Hedden argues, but while we need to do it, 
imaginary ideal creatures might not. Imaginary ideal creatures just get it right have no need of the 
reasoning mechanisms on which we, as a matter of our contingent limitations, depend. And it is 
appropriate, Hedden urges, that the theory of rationality should focus on what rationality requires 
as a matter of necessity on rational creatures of whatever kind. The contingencies of how we go 
about satisfying these constraints are something else he is happy to outsource.  
2 
A central aim of Hedden ?Ɛin this book is to improve the extensional adequacy of our understanding 
of rationality to cover various more or less fanciful thought experiments involving, inter alia, 
teletransportation, people who split in two, or have their beliefs and memories tampered with in 
strange and fanciful ways. My core worry, adumbrated in my title, is that in his eagerness to do 
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justice to the fanciful, Hedden loses sight of the everyday. This latter failing is evident, for example, 
when it comes to the principle of expert deference. The principle is interesting but of no practical 
interest whatever. For there are of course no experts as Hedden defines experts and there are never 
likely to be. So the principle of expert deference, which tells me to adjust my beliefs so as to align 
them with the beliefs of experts in effect tells me nothing. If, as Hedden proposes at the outset (10-
12) the point of the concept of rationality is to help us evaluate, predict and guide actions, the 
principle of expert deference looks, at least for real human beings, decidedly pointless. The unreality 
of the principle  comes to the fore when Hedden address the worry, What if experts disagree? More 
precisely what if two experts have different  credences for the same proposition. In those 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨĨĞƌŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚĂĚǀŝĐĞ ?  
Well, sure, experts can disagree is by that we mean regular experts of the sort you and I might meet 
in the university cafeteria. But the principle of expert deference is not about them ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ
in Hedden ?ƐŝĚĞĂůŝƐĞĚƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƌĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůǁŝƚŚƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇmore evidence than you 
have. And such people, apprised as they necessarily are qua rational with the uniquely rational prior 
probability function, cannot knowingly disagree ǁŚĞƌĞĞĂĐŚŬŶŽǁƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĐƌĞĚĞŶĐĞƐ: this 
follows, Hedden tells us, from a result proved by Robert Aumann. And without relying on Aumann, 
Hedden also offers his own reasoning to the consistency of the principle assuming inter alia that not 
only the experts but you yourself are perfectly rational.  
OK, OK, the reader wants to know. But what about real people in real life? Where none of us is 
rational as Hedden understands it and there are no experts in his highly ideal, technical sense. Well, 
we are told: 
As for real life experts, I suspect that there will be no exceptionless principle for how to take 
their opinions into account, but in most cases the way in which you ought to defer to the 
opinions of real-life experts will more or less approximate that given in our formal 
principle.(167) 
/ ?ŵŶŽƚat all clear, given how extreme the idealisation, how strong the assumptions Hedden needs 
to make his principle consistent, what that can even mean. Hedden is clearly most comfortable with 
these rarefied levels of idealisation as they  ?offer the benefit of making things more precision and 
formally tractable ? (167) but this level of remoteness, indeed divorce, from the realities of human 
experience seems rather a high price to pay for precision and formal tractability.  
More unreality confronts us where the discussion of practical rationality takes it point of departure 
with expected utility theory. While certainly precise and formally tractable, taken as a theory of 
rationality, this is not immensely informative. Expected utility theory tells you what to do if you are 
an agent whose preferences satisfy some rather exigent completeness, transitivity, continuity and 
independence axioms. Actually it ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶĚŽƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐHedden observes (94), unless it is taken 
to embrace an imperative to maximize expected utility. And even that imperative is doubtful:  wide-
scopers about rationality  favouring a safer but still less helpful imperative in effect to either 
maximize expected utility or reconsider. Of course outwith perhaps certain very artificial toy 
circumstances, it is a safe bet that no human being has ever arrived at this attractive condition of 
perfect comprehensiveness and coherence in his preferences. Should any ever do so there would be 
a good way to describe her deliberation. Completed, done, finished. Expected utility theory as such 
is silent about the deliberative process that is supposed to get you there.   
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Divorce from reality only deepens when we think of the preferences of rational agents, as Hedden 
urges we do, as ultimate preferences, imposing order on maximally specific possibilities, in effect 
fully specified possible worlds. (See in particular, 46 and section 8.2.3.) Once again, human beings 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĞ. Fully specified possible worlds are just too large and complex to be, at least singly, 
objects of thought at all, excepting only perhaps the actual world  W demonstratively  W and a few 
extremely spare and simple toy worlds of interest only to metaphysicians.  
Likewise with the epistemic case, conditionalization principles offers instruction to those who are 
already extremely credally opinionated what adjustments to make in the light of new information. 
But of what credal opinions we should adopt in the first place it does not speak. Again as an account 
of epistemic rationality this might reasonably be thought to leave rather a lot out. But if 
conditionalization is not very helpful, synchronic conditonalization is less so. It basically tells us to 
have the credences we rationally ought to have given our evidence. This is good advice but, as a 
theory of epistemic rationality, a little empty.  
3.  
But while standard expected utility theory and standard conditionalization are where Hedden starts 
out, as the book procedes we leave them behind for the more purely synchronic principles he urges 
we should prefer. In effect Hedden urges we abandon a picture of rationality that says, Stick to your 
guns! for a picture of rationality that says, Get it right! Or a little more particularly, Get it right, never 
mind how! Fussing about the how is after all only an issue for creatures like ourselves with our 
contingent limitations. Imaginary ideal creatures,  ?creatures intellectually superior to ourselves ? with 
 ?no need for reasoning ? (185), ĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďŽƚŚĞƌ ?dŚĞǇũƵƐƚŐĞƚŝƚƌŝŐŚƚ ?The value of reasoning is 
instrumental and gets outsourced. Ideally rational creatures just get it right.  
This might be true for example of Professor Instinct. Professor Instinct, ůĞƚ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞ ?ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ go in 
for any reflective reasoning of any kind ever. He just gets pushed around by his instincts like a brute 
beast. But his instincts are good instincts. Whoever designed him designed him extremely well. His 
instincts guide him so reliably that he reliably decides what the uniquely correct utility function says 
he should decide and believes what the uniquely rational prior probability function tells him to 
believe on the basis of his evidence. /ŐƵĞƐƐŚĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƵŶŝƋƵĞůǇ
rational prior probability function is so long as the system that generates his instinctive beliefs is 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐŝƚĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚŝĨǁŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŝƐŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝƚƌŝŐŚƚŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚŚŝƐ
 ?evidence ? is. If we can outsource everything else, we can surely outsource that too and count as 
evidence any kind of causal input to the system that furnishes it (it, not him) with information about 
the world. 
Do we want to call Professor Instinct rational? It seems a little odd to. It is a very natural 
commonplace pointedly to contrast reason and instinct. But Professor Instinct satisfies what Hedden 
takes to be the strict requirements that any being must satisfy to count as rational. So I guess 
Hedden has to say, by his own lights, that Professor Instinct is rational. And maybe fair enough. But 
what about Professor Lucky? Professor Lucky is a what we might call a Randomizer, someone who 
arrives at her beliefs and decisions by some entirely random procedure. Of the many possible 
Randomizers, most do very badly, getting almost everything wrong almost all the time. But there are 
a small minority who get lucky and do pretty well. A fantastically lucky very tiny minority, one in a 
few squillion perhaps, do just perfectly and get from one end of life to the other believing and 
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deciding exactly as the uniquely correct utility function and the uniquely rational prior probability 
function would tell them to. Professor Lucky, the lucky so-and-so, happens to belong to that very 
tiny minority. If what matters is getting it right, Professor Lucky gets full marks. But is she rational? 
Well, surely not. ^ŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĨŽƌŵŚĞƌďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐďǇĂŶǇŬŝŶĚŽĨƌĞůŝĂďůĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ or 
process. But a reliable mechanism or process again is surely a merely instrumental good, one that 
almost all of us need, but that Lucky Randomizers like Professor Lucky do not. To be sure she 
ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞŬŶŽǁŶŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŚŽǁůƵĐŬǇƐŚĞǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞďƵƚƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇŚĂƐŚĞƌŶĞĞĚŝŶŐĂ
reliable mechanism in the rather attenuated sense of need in which someone who, as it turns out, 
will never be afflicted by a fire, can be said to need fire insurance.  
WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ>ƵĐŬǇŝƐƐƵƌĞůǇŶŽƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶĂŶǇŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƵƚƐŚĞŐĞƚƐŝƚƌŝŐŚƚ ?/ĨƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ the end 
and we can outsource the means, it looks wrorryingly like we can outsource basically everything 
including everything we ordinarily take to distinguish the rational from the irrational. At least in the 
epistemic case we can. In the practical case, ŝƚǁŽŶ ?ƚƐŽŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇŐŝǀĞƵƐ all we want to have 
decisions that conform to what the uniquely correct utility function would demand without it 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞǇŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞ ?/ƚǁŽŶ ?ƚŐŝǀĞƵƐĂůůǁĞǁĂŶƚŝĨ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁĞĂƌĞ
Aristotle and think the normatively authoritative human ergon is ʗʐʖ୳ʎ ୡʆɹʌɶɸɿɲ ʃɲʏ୑ ʄʊɶʉʆ2, 
 ?rational activity of the soul ?.  More generally, it might credibly be supposed that autonomous 
practical reasoning is more than an instrumental good but a central part of what we value in our 
lives such that we would be properly unwilling heteronomously to outsource our practical reasoning 
to some external agency however perfectly reliable in making correct decisions.
3
  
This worry expands naturally to Hedden ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽstion that we see rationality as time-slice first, the 
primary norms if perhaps not the derivative being time-slice centric. Here again, whatever we think 
of the epistemic case the practical case looks problematic. Again if you are Aristotle the end of 
practical reason is eudaimonia ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƐŶ ?ƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŽƌĨĂŝůƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƚĂŵŽŵĞŶƚďƵƚĂn 
enduring, settled state. If you are Hume, perhaps, what you are after is a life that, viewed as a 
whole, is able to bear your survey.
4
 Of course on a one time-slice-friendly reading of expected utility 
what matters is the maximal satisfaction of your preferences now. But Hedden ĐĂŶ ?ƚǀĞƌǇĐƌĞĚŝďůǇ
accept that as it amounts to the present-aim theory of rationality that is the orginal target of PĂƌĨŝƚ ?Ɛ
Future Tuesday supposed reductio that so impresses him.
5
 And of course Hedddon ultimately only 
accepts expected utility theory insofar as ones preferences match up with the uniquely correct utility 
function. And what this tells me to do is aim for the whole world to be as good as possible. As the 
world is extended in time that again is not really a time-centric basic norm. Still, it might be 
countered, my basic concern is to have, at any given time a utility function that matches up with the 
ultimately correct one. But surely not. For one thing if what matters is that the world be as 
objectively good as possible, surely what I ought to do is have the utility function I have in whatever 
attainable-by-me world is best. And that might not be the correct utility function. The correct utility 
function Uc might surely be self-effacing: the best way to attain the best outcome might be to 
instantiate some other, quite different utility function Uo.  For another, even prescinding from such 
discomfiting possibilities, the desirability of my having at any given time a utility function that 
                                                          
2
 Nicomachean Ethics 1098a. 
3
 Griffin 1986, p. 9. Crisp 1997, pp. 61-2. 
4
 Treatise 3.6.6. 
5
 Parfit 1986, pp. 123-4. 
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matches up with the correct one is surely not itself normatively fundamental ?/Ĩŝƚ ?ƐďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂƚĂ
ƉĞĂĐĞĚĞĂůŝƐƐƚƌƵĐŬƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǁĂƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ?ƚŚĞŶŝƚ ?ƐŽƌĚŝŶĂƌŝůǇŶŽĚŽƵďƚďĞƚƚĞƌŝĨƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚŚĂŶĚƐ
on the relevant causal levers so prefer. But we want them to prefer that way because of what we 
want to happen, not vice versa. With epistemic rationality our ultimate aim is simply truth. Direction 
of fit is word-world and we seek simply to understand and not to change the world. So time-slice 
centeredness makes some sense. But with practical rationality, where the direction of fit is reversed 
the final aim is not  W at least not for the sort of consequentialist perspective that appeals to Hedden, 
to get our preferences and decisions right but that the world be as good as we can make it not just 
now but in the very long term.  
4. 
Hedden ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƵŶŝƋƵĞŶĞƐƐwill raise many eyebrows. It comes in two parts. The 
first is a discussion of the approximately Humean claim that there are no substantive (as opposed to 
forŵĂů ?ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐŽŶƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?,ĞƌĞŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐŽŶůǇƚŽƌĞũĞĐƚƌŽŽŵĞ ?ƐǁĞůů-
known argument against so-called  ?moderate Humeanism ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐĂŶĚĞŶĚŽƌƐĞƐWƌĨŝƚ ?Ɛ
argument from the irrationality of  ?future Tuesday indifference ?. He then argues (simplifying a little) 
ƚŚĂƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƵŶŝƋƵĞŶĞƐƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚďǇ>ĞǁŝƐ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĂƐďĞůŝĞĨƌĞƐƵůƚƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐǁĞ
restrict the desires/preferences we consider to those ultimate desires/preferences that apply to 
maximally specific possibilities. He then argues: 
Plausibly, the fundamental normative facts, such as which moral theory is correct, are a 
priori. And arguably, ideally rational agents are certain of all a priori facts. After all an agents 
evidence always a priori entails these facts and it is natural to think that an ideally rational 
agent will be certain of everything that is a priori entailed by her evidence. Putting these two 
things together, we get the result that whenever one world is better than another, an ideally 
rational agent will be certain that the one world is better than another. (160) 
That is so breathtakingly quick and dirty a passage of argument for a claim at once so extremely 
strong and so central to Hedden ?Ɛ understanding of the rational that it is hard to know where  to 
begin. For one thing we can note again how little bearing it can credibly have on the evaluative, 
predictive or deliberative activities of human beings given the wildness of the idealization involved. 
For another thing it is not just highly arguable that the fundamental normative facts can be known a 
priori but that there are any, or any very interesting, fundamental normative facts if by that is 
understood normative facts that float free of any dependence on particularities of human nature 
and human society.
6
 &ŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐ ?/ ?ŵŶŽƚƐƵƌĞŚŽǁƚŽƚĂŬĞ ?entail ?. Hedden takes himself to be 
opposing the approximately Humean view that there are no substantive (as opposed to formal) 
rational constraint on preferences. In fact you might not believe you need to take that anti-Humean 
line to defend something like uniqueness. R. M. Hare famously believed you could get your 
preferences into correct alignment with what they rationally ought to be given only the minimal 
start-up kit of  ?logic and the facts ?;7 but I think almost nobody now believes that form of moral 
logicism. That may mean something a bit meatier than logical entailment will be needed and it 
would be nice to know what. The transition from  ?is ? to  ?ought ? is a notoriously tricky one and it 
would be nice to know how ideally rational agents do it. Perhaps they just have compelling intuitions 
                                                          
6
 See Rawls 1972, pp. 159-160, Lenman 2000, pp. 361-362. 
7
 Hare 1981, pp. 6, 101ff 
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which reliably track independent normative truths.  After all, Hedden ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚthink rational beings 
need to actually reason their way to getting things right so long as they get things right. (Even if in 
this case that might involve getting very lucky indeed.
8
) But we mere humans, with our conflicting 
and uncertain intuitions do need to do some reasoning to determine what to do. And Hedden really 
has nothing to tell us about how that might work. 
The phrase  ?such as which moral theory is correct ? in the passage just quoted is a telling one. Right at 
the start of the book, Hedden notes that morality might be understood in ways unfriendly to time-
slice rationality. Ideas like promissory obligation or the Rawlsian doctrine of the separateness of 
persons seems to depend on taking the relation of personal identity over time very seriously. He 
proposes two ways out of this worry. The first is another outsourcing stratagem that distinguishes 
morality from rationality. The second elects to understand morality along some rigorously utilitarian 
lines that concerns itself only with how much welfare there is without caring how it gets distributed 
over persons or times. By the time we get to the passage just discussed he seems to have come 
down pretty clearly in favour of the latter escape, including moral facts among the normative facts 
the ideally rational agent is supposed, in virtue of being an ideally rational agent, in a position  to 
know a priori. But there is no argument  here or anywhere else in the book to support this extremely 
strong claim about how morality should be understood or to address the many serious objections to 
it.  
5 
Hedden ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ,ƵŵĞĂŶŝƐŵŝƐĂůƐŽĂůŝƚƚůĞƉƵǌǌůŝŶŐƚŽŵĞ ?tŚĂƚŚĂƐŵĞƉƵǌǌůĞĚŝƐƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂů
ƌŽůĞŚĞŐŝǀĞƐƚŽWĂƌĨŝƚ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĨƵƚƵƌĞdƵĞƐĚĂǇŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ. We all remember how it goes: 
A certain hedonist cares greatly about the quality of his future experiences. With one 
exception, he cares equally about all the parts of his future. The exception is that he has 
Future-Tuesday-Indifference. Throughout every Tuesday he cares in the normal way about 
what is happening to him. But he never cares about possible pains or pleasures on a future 
Tuesday.
9
 
It is a nice example of very plausibly irrational preferences. But notice something about the 
irrationality that is involved. It is diachronic. It is a failure of stability over time in FTI-ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽ-
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽdƵĞƐĚĂǇƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƉĂŝŶƐ ?,ĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĐĂƌĞĂďŽƵƚĨƵƚƵƌĞdƵĞƐĚĂǇƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƉĂŝŶƐ
when the Tuesday in question is future but when Tuesday arrives he cares about them  ?in the 
normal way ? ?ŶĚ from reading chapter 7 I thought I understood what Hedden had to say about this 
kind of instability. What I thought he wanted to say was, It is very nice not to be like that because if 
you are like that all manner of suboptimal stuff will happen to you. But it is like having a good 
ŵĞŵŽƌǇ Pŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚrationality. Which makes the centrality bestowed on the 
example puzzling. What got outsourced in chapter 7 should surely stay outsourced in chapter 8. We 
might perhaps try to eliminate the element of diachronic instability by trying to imagine a person 
who even on Tuesday is indifferent to what happens to him on that very Tuesday. This character, the 
consistently Tuesday indifferent person would be a very strange creature indeed. So strange that, as 
Sharon Street persuasively urges in her highly instructive discussion of the argument, we really have 
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no grounds confidently to write him off as irrational once we seriously try to imagine what such a 
person would be like.
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There are three crucial things Hedden thinks we want the notion of rationality to do for us. (10-12) 
We want to use it to evaluate thoughts and actions of thinkers and agents, ourselves and others, we 
want to use it to predict and explain them and we want to use it to think and deliberate what actions 
to perform and what beliefs to adopt. He goes on to offer a defense of his two key claims, 
synchronicity and impartiality, which relentlessly pursues two thematic strategies: idealise like crazy 
and outsource almost everything. My fear for him is that he pursues them to an extent that the 
resulting picture of rationality is of very limited interest to us very unideal human beings in trying to 
understand our own our very unideal efforts to do these very crucial things.  
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uniqueness and a weaker, more relativistic version  would be adequate to his purposes. Indeed he claims in a 
footnote (p. 158), though he does not argue, that preference uniqueness is perfectly consistent both with 
expressivist and subjectivist understandings of metaethics. In that case he may have no quarrel with someone 
like Street. But then I start to lose my grip on why he takes himself, as he pretty clearly does to have a quarrel 
with the Humean to which the appeal to the future Tuesday example is relevant.  
  
